Sunday, June 27, 2004
Keep watching and waiting
When the blog started, I was concerned it wouldn't work. Most blogs are written daily, like a diary. I've not been that prolific. That's more on account of the subject than my inadequacies as a reporter. An investor has days where there is nothing to add, indeed weeks. It's a passive pursuit, not an active one. Usually, there is nothing to do or respond to. Survey the scene, monitor your investments, look for any trends or themes emerging and if an opportunity presents itself, strike fast. Think of yourself as an amateur fisherman rather than a tennis player. Relax, watch and wait. Don't get that placid and calm face rouged with serve and volley.
Since my last portfolio update I've purchased 890 Ben Bailey shares at 390p. That distorts any comparison. Chaucer has recovered slightly, Ben Bailey has fallen to compensate. My latest Ben Bailey position is in profit and Mayborn have barely moved. Most heartening is Dana Petroleum. Despite no news, the price has advanced over ten percent and now sits at a high for 2004.
on June 02:
BBC: Ben Bailey, 1281 shares on 20/02/03 at 178p (420p, £5,380.20)
CHU: Chaucer Holdings, 8092 shares on 06/10/03 at 42.88p (43p, £3479.56)
CHU: Chaucer Holdings, 4075 shares on 06/04/2004 at 54.75p (43p, £1752.25)
DNX: Dana Petroleum, 1551 shares on 20/11/03 at 223.75p (267p, £4141.17)
MBY: Mayborn Group, 1406 shares on 15/03/04 at 282p (255p, £3585.30)
Cash holdings: £158.97
A grand total of £18,497,45.
as of today:
BBC: Ben Bailey, 1281 shares on 20/02/03 at 178p (395p, £5059.95)
BBC: Ben Bailey, 890 shares on 21/06/04 at 390p (395p, £3515.50)
CHU: Chaucer Holdings, 8092 shares on 06/10/03 at 42.88p (47.5p, £3843.70)
CHU: Chaucer Holdings, 4075 shares on 06/04/2004 at 54.75p (47.5p, £2231.06)
DNX: Dana Petroleum, 1551 shares on 20/11/03 at 223.75p (305p, £4730.55)
MBY: Mayborn Group, 1406 shares on 15/03/04 at 282p (257p, £3613.42)
Cash holdings: £158.97
Total: £23,153.15
Dana's recent excellent performance can be attributed to the high price of crude oil. Share prices have risen across the oil sector in anticipation of higher profits. I'll be revisiting my evaluation of Dana in my next blog. Until that fair value is reached, I'll watch and I'll wait.
The Artful Dodger
(0) comments
Since my last portfolio update I've purchased 890 Ben Bailey shares at 390p. That distorts any comparison. Chaucer has recovered slightly, Ben Bailey has fallen to compensate. My latest Ben Bailey position is in profit and Mayborn have barely moved. Most heartening is Dana Petroleum. Despite no news, the price has advanced over ten percent and now sits at a high for 2004.
on June 02:
BBC: Ben Bailey, 1281 shares on 20/02/03 at 178p (420p, £5,380.20)
CHU: Chaucer Holdings, 8092 shares on 06/10/03 at 42.88p (43p, £3479.56)
CHU: Chaucer Holdings, 4075 shares on 06/04/2004 at 54.75p (43p, £1752.25)
DNX: Dana Petroleum, 1551 shares on 20/11/03 at 223.75p (267p, £4141.17)
MBY: Mayborn Group, 1406 shares on 15/03/04 at 282p (255p, £3585.30)
Cash holdings: £158.97
A grand total of £18,497,45.
as of today:
BBC: Ben Bailey, 1281 shares on 20/02/03 at 178p (395p, £5059.95)
BBC: Ben Bailey, 890 shares on 21/06/04 at 390p (395p, £3515.50)
CHU: Chaucer Holdings, 8092 shares on 06/10/03 at 42.88p (47.5p, £3843.70)
CHU: Chaucer Holdings, 4075 shares on 06/04/2004 at 54.75p (47.5p, £2231.06)
DNX: Dana Petroleum, 1551 shares on 20/11/03 at 223.75p (305p, £4730.55)
MBY: Mayborn Group, 1406 shares on 15/03/04 at 282p (257p, £3613.42)
Cash holdings: £158.97
Total: £23,153.15
Dana's recent excellent performance can be attributed to the high price of crude oil. Share prices have risen across the oil sector in anticipation of higher profits. I'll be revisiting my evaluation of Dana in my next blog. Until that fair value is reached, I'll watch and I'll wait.
The Artful Dodger
Thursday, June 24, 2004
Shopping in the Sales
It's not just high street retailers that deeply discount to attract custom, the stock market does too. As the shops are desperate to clear out their wooly jumpers come spring, speculators get desperate to offload holdings at very attractive prices when they feel a change in the air.
Last week's comment from Mervyn King, governor of the Bank of England, that house prices can go down as well as up, caused panic among investors in the sector. Falling house prices would choke profits, would likely persist for several years and could bankrupt some companies. When share prices fall away significantly the investor must discover what has so seriously spooked shareholders. Are the falls unique to my investment or common with the rest of the sector and market? What newsflow has precipitated the commotion?
Ben Bailey shares fell below 400p. From the May 7th AGM statement, the company is enjoying strong trading. I reckon house prices in Ben Bailey's area less vulnerable than the part of the market Mr King's comments were aimed at, the overheated south-east of England. With interim results expected early August, I took advantage of the stock market sales and bought 890 more Ben Bailey shares at 390p.
The Dana Petroleum annual general meeting last Tuesday yielded no more information on the company's progress. Companies often choose to release a trading statement on these occasions. In 2003, Dana made a comprehensive report of prospects and plans. Rumour has it a statement will follow soon.
Chaucer however, cheered the market with their AGM statement yesterday:
The 2004 year of account has started positively with total gross written premiums ahead of the same stage for 2003 and with pricing remaining strong overall.
...
A continuance of the current positive trading conditions, combined with the further development of business written under similar circumstances in 2002 and 2003, should, on the basis of average claims frequency, produce another strong underwriting result for Chaucer in 2004.'
...
'I am delighted with Chaucer's continued progress. The year has started well from an underwriting perspective, with premium prices and volumes on target.'
I'm confident my 66p price target for Chaucer will be achieved and similarly 520p for Ben Bailey. But how long must I wait?
The Artful Dodger
Thursday, June 17, 2004
The first chapter of Max Gunther's The Zurich Axioms introduces the cornerstone of investment strategy, risk and attitude to risk.
Gunther awards one Major and Two Minor axioms to the subject but his philosophy is not completely in harmony with mine.
Worry is not a sickness but a sign of health. If you are not worried, you are not risking enough.
But how worried should we be? Stress and angst aren't easily measured. My Ben Bailey and Chaucer investments concern me, I'm worried they will never reach the fair prices I've calculated or take so long that too many better opportunities will pass while my capital is tied up. Worries like this are inherent to investing - suffer and savour them. The absence of worry implies an ignorance of risk or an insignificant exposure - each is an aberration but the amount of worry present should never be less than some.
Always play for meaningful stakes
Gunther explains:
The only way to beat they system is to play for meaningful stakes. This doesn't mean you should bet amounts whose loss would bankrupt you...but it does mean you must get over the fear of being hurt
There is no point entering a venture if the outcome won't make a difference. I adhere to Minor Axiom I in my own portfolio, only buying on the prospect of a thirty percent gain and each time I try to invest more than the last. As per my previous blog: Failure to adhere to Minor Axiom I 'Always Play for Meaningful Stakes' as an investor is akin to an acrobat performing cartwheels on a park bench. If you suffer a loss it won't hurt too bad but you won't make much dough at it either.
Resist the allure of diversification
it means spreading your money around.Spreading it thin. Putting it into a lot of little speculations instead of a few big ones
I disagree. Numerous studies have shown via statistical analysis how diversification will reduce portfolio risk. My motivation for diversifying is that an investment is made when the individual believes the balance of probability is in his favour. Investors aren't clairvoyants and error is present in any judgement. As we continue to diversify, we would be less confident in each investment/speculation than the previous, slavish diversification is bad but some diversification is essential. Randomness and luck are always present, concentration to say, one or two positions leaves the portfolio extremely vulnerable to misfortune specific to a single company or industry.
Ten thousand pounds could pay for a farm with a hundred chickens, fifty sheep and a dozen pigs. Or a farm with two prize bullocks. Now even if the expected return from the concentrated farm was superior to the diversified farm, the risk is just too great to be taking. A force majeure event such as a lightning strike at the diversified farm might kill a dozen chucks. Better than losing one of your bullocks.
The Artful Dodger
(0) comments
Gunther awards one Major and Two Minor axioms to the subject but his philosophy is not completely in harmony with mine.
Major Axiom I: on Risk
Worry is not a sickness but a sign of health. If you are not worried, you are not risking enough.
But how worried should we be? Stress and angst aren't easily measured. My Ben Bailey and Chaucer investments concern me, I'm worried they will never reach the fair prices I've calculated or take so long that too many better opportunities will pass while my capital is tied up. Worries like this are inherent to investing - suffer and savour them. The absence of worry implies an ignorance of risk or an insignificant exposure - each is an aberration but the amount of worry present should never be less than some.
Minor Axiom I
Always play for meaningful stakes
Gunther explains:
The only way to beat they system is to play for meaningful stakes. This doesn't mean you should bet amounts whose loss would bankrupt you...but it does mean you must get over the fear of being hurt
There is no point entering a venture if the outcome won't make a difference. I adhere to Minor Axiom I in my own portfolio, only buying on the prospect of a thirty percent gain and each time I try to invest more than the last. As per my previous blog: Failure to adhere to Minor Axiom I 'Always Play for Meaningful Stakes' as an investor is akin to an acrobat performing cartwheels on a park bench. If you suffer a loss it won't hurt too bad but you won't make much dough at it either.
Minor Axiom II
Resist the allure of diversification
it means spreading your money around.Spreading it thin. Putting it into a lot of little speculations instead of a few big ones
I disagree. Numerous studies have shown via statistical analysis how diversification will reduce portfolio risk. My motivation for diversifying is that an investment is made when the individual believes the balance of probability is in his favour. Investors aren't clairvoyants and error is present in any judgement. As we continue to diversify, we would be less confident in each investment/speculation than the previous, slavish diversification is bad but some diversification is essential. Randomness and luck are always present, concentration to say, one or two positions leaves the portfolio extremely vulnerable to misfortune specific to a single company or industry.
Ten thousand pounds could pay for a farm with a hundred chickens, fifty sheep and a dozen pigs. Or a farm with two prize bullocks. Now even if the expected return from the concentrated farm was superior to the diversified farm, the risk is just too great to be taking. A force majeure event such as a lightning strike at the diversified farm might kill a dozen chucks. Better than losing one of your bullocks.
The Artful Dodger
Tuesday, June 15, 2004
Do rules for investment exist?
My immediate answer would normally be no, followed by the aloof claim that investment is not a science but a very difficult art. But revisiting my bookshelves recently I stumbled across one of the few books on investing I have ever bought, Max Gunther's The Zurich Axioms. Webster's has the following to say about the word 'axiom':
1. (Logic & Math.) A self-evident and necessary truth, or a proposition whose truth is so evident as first sight that no reasoning or demonstration can make it plainer; a proposition which it is necessary to take for granted
2. An established principle in some art or science, which, though not a necessary truth, is universally received; as, the axioms of political economy.
Gunther isn't so arrogant to believe the Zurich Axioms are of the mathematical variety, if he did this book would resemble The Highway Code, sell for £1.49 and his children would starve. The author supports his assertions over a very readable 164 pages and at £7.99 his son needn't wear his older sister's dress to school. Gunther boils the nuggets of nuance I've alluded to down into twelve major and sixteen minor axioms.
Several of the axioms are so entrenched in my own philosophy they approach the mathematical definition of 'axiom', a proposition that it is necessary to take for granted. Failure to adhere to Minor Axiom I 'Always Play for Meaningful Stakes' as an investor is akin to an acrobat performing cartwheels on a park bench. If you suffer a loss it won't hurt too bad but you won't make much dough at it either.
I'll cover each of the Zurich Axioms in forthcoming blogs but if intrigued by Gunther's philosophy, see this.
The Artful Dodger
(0) comments
My immediate answer would normally be no, followed by the aloof claim that investment is not a science but a very difficult art. But revisiting my bookshelves recently I stumbled across one of the few books on investing I have ever bought, Max Gunther's The Zurich Axioms. Webster's has the following to say about the word 'axiom':
1. (Logic & Math.) A self-evident and necessary truth, or a proposition whose truth is so evident as first sight that no reasoning or demonstration can make it plainer; a proposition which it is necessary to take for granted
2. An established principle in some art or science, which, though not a necessary truth, is universally received; as, the axioms of political economy.
Gunther isn't so arrogant to believe the Zurich Axioms are of the mathematical variety, if he did this book would resemble The Highway Code, sell for £1.49 and his children would starve. The author supports his assertions over a very readable 164 pages and at £7.99 his son needn't wear his older sister's dress to school. Gunther boils the nuggets of nuance I've alluded to down into twelve major and sixteen minor axioms.
Several of the axioms are so entrenched in my own philosophy they approach the mathematical definition of 'axiom', a proposition that it is necessary to take for granted. Failure to adhere to Minor Axiom I 'Always Play for Meaningful Stakes' as an investor is akin to an acrobat performing cartwheels on a park bench. If you suffer a loss it won't hurt too bad but you won't make much dough at it either.
I'll cover each of the Zurich Axioms in forthcoming blogs but if intrigued by Gunther's philosophy, see this.
The Artful Dodger
Sunday, June 13, 2004
Investment slogans, so popular in financial media, should be accompanied with a public wealth warning. These insidious catchphrases fool the inexperienced into believing investing is either a glamourous and extremely sophisticated endeavour or the fiscal equivalent of sawing a woman in half - once armed with the magic secret, success is simplicity itself. Investment is not like either of these, or indeed any other pursuit. You need a strong but flexible grip of the nuances. Nothing in this is infallible, including these dollops of dogma.
How are we supposed to reconcile enemy number one sell in May with never sell Shell? Or no-one ever went broke taking a profit with buy it right and hold tight? These soundbites peddled as panacea are left knock-kneed and wheezing after a logic MOT. Sell in May started life as Sell in May, stay away, come back on St. Leger day. If any reader can point out just how investment returns are affected by the day on which a
horse race is scheduled and also how you might re-enter the market on a Saturday, when the exchange is closed, I'd be very happy to hear all about it via comment or email.
These abberrations survive not necessarily because they are valid but because they are easy on the ear and the journalist's twenty pence biro. Never sell Shell is a pretty pun that allows the brain to be disengaged for a moment or two. At times when a shareholding is showing a loss buy it right and hold tight becomes an investment motto, allowing the investor to convince himself he did buy right and as a righteous investor will now hold tight for the pay dirt that awaits the deserving.
There is usually no difference in the quality of reason in an exact reversal of these supposed tenets of shareholding. Why should we be buying in May rather than selling? Why never sell Shell, how about never buy MFI?
As in the previous blog, the investor should himself question any comment or source's motivations, similarly any recommended strategy or ethos. Where is the supporting evidence? Is this consistent with logic and common sense? Last year, the UK stock market produced positive returns between May and the St. Leger. The in-depth articles on the historical success of the cliche have been absent in 2004 and the hacks were robbed of the chance to produce an article that has previously written itself. Shame that, you'll have to put up with me instead.
The Artful Dodger
(0) comments
How are we supposed to reconcile enemy number one sell in May with never sell Shell? Or no-one ever went broke taking a profit with buy it right and hold tight? These soundbites peddled as panacea are left knock-kneed and wheezing after a logic MOT. Sell in May started life as Sell in May, stay away, come back on St. Leger day. If any reader can point out just how investment returns are affected by the day on which a
horse race is scheduled and also how you might re-enter the market on a Saturday, when the exchange is closed, I'd be very happy to hear all about it via comment or email.
These abberrations survive not necessarily because they are valid but because they are easy on the ear and the journalist's twenty pence biro. Never sell Shell is a pretty pun that allows the brain to be disengaged for a moment or two. At times when a shareholding is showing a loss buy it right and hold tight becomes an investment motto, allowing the investor to convince himself he did buy right and as a righteous investor will now hold tight for the pay dirt that awaits the deserving.
There is usually no difference in the quality of reason in an exact reversal of these supposed tenets of shareholding. Why should we be buying in May rather than selling? Why never sell Shell, how about never buy MFI?
As in the previous blog, the investor should himself question any comment or source's motivations, similarly any recommended strategy or ethos. Where is the supporting evidence? Is this consistent with logic and common sense? Last year, the UK stock market produced positive returns between May and the St. Leger. The in-depth articles on the historical success of the cliche have been absent in 2004 and the hacks were robbed of the chance to produce an article that has previously written itself. Shame that, you'll have to put up with me instead.
The Artful Dodger
Tuesday, June 08, 2004
I've been an Investors Chronicle subscriber for over two years. An excellent magazine for pointing me in the direction of companies to research further. When a listed company reports results, the Investors Chronicle publishes statistics every investor needs, price-to-earnings ratio, dividend yield, assets and debt. These numbers are calculated from the results statement, if the Chronicle points out a software company trading at thirty times annual profit, I'll move on to find a cheaper offering, saving me ploughing through company reports and getting the measure of the company myself.
The Investors Chronicle is better known for its share tips section. Normally approximately five companies feature, a page is devoted to each and the magazine concludes buy/sell.
Now, if you have been reading the magazine for as long as I have you may have noticed that irrespective of market conditions, the BUY recommendations in the Investors Chronicle outnumber the SELL recommendations, typically by four to one. Even back when the FTSE-100 was trading almost fifty percent higher and shares looked more overvalued than at any point in the previous decade, the IC persisted, with all the gusto of a Tunisian Rolex salesman that bargains in the UK stock market were legion. Blatantly, more opportunities to sell existed, so why weren't the Investors Chronicle filling their tips section with SELL recommendations?
The answer lies with the interests of the Investors Chronicle's biggest advertisers, the stockbrokers. Brokers comprise a huge percentage of advertising revenue at the Investors Chronicle. In turn, brokers revenue is generated through customer trades, the buy and sell orders people like myself ring and request. An Investors Chronicle recommendation will generate an extraordinary level of market interest and in the case of smaller companies, can result in significant price changes on the day of publication. This adds up to a lot of extra commissions for the brokers every Friday morning. However, SELL recommendations produce a fraction of the trades buy recommendations do as investors cannot sell shares they do not own.
This is the crux of the anomaly between media BUY and SELL recommendations and has (finally) led me to the entire point of this blog. Vested interests. Any investor must be fully aware of the interests and motivations of any stock commentator, participant and so-called expert. The main culprits being fund managers and stockbrokers. These people consistently talk up opportunities for investors even when any upside is limited, all with the intention of generating sales. Then there is the bulletin board cheerleader, who has a vested interest in galvanising the public into buying shares in speculative small cap stocks that he might exit later at a profit. In short, believe nothing.
As of today, there is an email link on Artful Investing where I may be contacted with any questions, complaints or comments. I promise to treat all communications in complete confidence but would like to use this facility as an inspiration for blogs in the future, where I might answer your questions in the blog or by mail.Email The Artful Dodger.
At this point the cynics amongst you may be wondering just what my vested interests are and whether I can be taken at my word. My interests in writing are detailed in my innaugural blog here. Can I be trusted, however? Why of course I can, after all, I am The Artful Dodger.
(0) comments
The Investors Chronicle is better known for its share tips section. Normally approximately five companies feature, a page is devoted to each and the magazine concludes buy/sell.
Now, if you have been reading the magazine for as long as I have you may have noticed that irrespective of market conditions, the BUY recommendations in the Investors Chronicle outnumber the SELL recommendations, typically by four to one. Even back when the FTSE-100 was trading almost fifty percent higher and shares looked more overvalued than at any point in the previous decade, the IC persisted, with all the gusto of a Tunisian Rolex salesman that bargains in the UK stock market were legion. Blatantly, more opportunities to sell existed, so why weren't the Investors Chronicle filling their tips section with SELL recommendations?
The answer lies with the interests of the Investors Chronicle's biggest advertisers, the stockbrokers. Brokers comprise a huge percentage of advertising revenue at the Investors Chronicle. In turn, brokers revenue is generated through customer trades, the buy and sell orders people like myself ring and request. An Investors Chronicle recommendation will generate an extraordinary level of market interest and in the case of smaller companies, can result in significant price changes on the day of publication. This adds up to a lot of extra commissions for the brokers every Friday morning. However, SELL recommendations produce a fraction of the trades buy recommendations do as investors cannot sell shares they do not own.
This is the crux of the anomaly between media BUY and SELL recommendations and has (finally) led me to the entire point of this blog. Vested interests. Any investor must be fully aware of the interests and motivations of any stock commentator, participant and so-called expert. The main culprits being fund managers and stockbrokers. These people consistently talk up opportunities for investors even when any upside is limited, all with the intention of generating sales. Then there is the bulletin board cheerleader, who has a vested interest in galvanising the public into buying shares in speculative small cap stocks that he might exit later at a profit. In short, believe nothing.
As of today, there is an email link on Artful Investing where I may be contacted with any questions, complaints or comments. I promise to treat all communications in complete confidence but would like to use this facility as an inspiration for blogs in the future, where I might answer your questions in the blog or by mail.Email The Artful Dodger.
At this point the cynics amongst you may be wondering just what my vested interests are and whether I can be taken at my word. My interests in writing are detailed in my innaugural blog here. Can I be trusted, however? Why of course I can, after all, I am The Artful Dodger.
Wednesday, June 02, 2004
It's been a very frustrating few weeks. Newsflow from my companies has remained encouraging but prices have turned downwards.
Despite positive news from Chaucer, the price has tumbled alarmingly, my latest position at 54.75p losing value like a street that has acquired a conrete skateboard park at one end - creeping down to my original purchase back in November 2003 at 42.88p. Who cares if the insurance operator continues to be rewarded by excellent syndicate forecasts (Updated Syndicate Forecasts) the market masses have decreed the good times are over for the Lloyds insurers.
Chaucer will be giving another trading statement at their June 23rd AGM, one day after the Dana Petroleum annual shindig in sunny Aberdeen. Dana are the one comfort to my portfolio of the last month, burgeoning oil prices have enticed investors' capital to the exploration and production sector, the shares now trade at 267p to sell. The optimism surrounding this sector will hopefully yield more increases in the next fortnight.
Ben Bailey and Mayborn have both lost ground slightly but as you can see, in comparison to my last update, Chaucer has suffered most storm damage.
My last portfolio review came on March 21st:
BBC: Ben Bailey, 1281 shares on 20/02/03 at 178p (458p, £5,886.98)
CHU: Chaucer Holdings, 8092 shares on 06/10/03 at 42.88p (49p, £3965.08)
DNX: Dana Petroleum, 1551 shares on 20/11/03 at 223.75p (242p, £3753.42)
MBY: Mayborn Group, 1406 shares on 15/03/04 at 282p (275p, £3866.50)
Cash holdings: £2256.62
Since I've received dividends from Ben Bailey and Mayborn and bought more Chaucer shares:
BBC: Ben Bailey, 1281 shares on 20/02/03 at 178p (420p, £5,380.20)
CHU: Chaucer Holdings, 8092 shares on 06/10/03 at 42.88p (43p, £3479.56)
CHU: Chaucer Holdings, 4075 shares on 06/04/2004 at 54.75p (43p, £1752.25)
DNX: Dana Petroleum, 1551 shares on 20/11/03 at 223.75p (267p, £4141.17)
MBY: Mayborn Group, 1406 shares on 15/03/04 at 282p (255p, £3585.30)
Cash holdings: £158.97
A grand total of £18,497,45.
It's worth noting that two of my losing positions, more Chaucer at 54.75p and Mayborn at 282p both violated my 30% margin of safety rule at the time of purchase. Discipline is a very valuable virtue in an investor, if I had waited for my 30% criteria to be met I would still be at a loss on both of these purchases, but a good deal less so than currently.
The Artful Dodger
(0) comments
Despite positive news from Chaucer, the price has tumbled alarmingly, my latest position at 54.75p losing value like a street that has acquired a conrete skateboard park at one end - creeping down to my original purchase back in November 2003 at 42.88p. Who cares if the insurance operator continues to be rewarded by excellent syndicate forecasts (Updated Syndicate Forecasts) the market masses have decreed the good times are over for the Lloyds insurers.
Chaucer will be giving another trading statement at their June 23rd AGM, one day after the Dana Petroleum annual shindig in sunny Aberdeen. Dana are the one comfort to my portfolio of the last month, burgeoning oil prices have enticed investors' capital to the exploration and production sector, the shares now trade at 267p to sell. The optimism surrounding this sector will hopefully yield more increases in the next fortnight.
Ben Bailey and Mayborn have both lost ground slightly but as you can see, in comparison to my last update, Chaucer has suffered most storm damage.
My last portfolio review came on March 21st:
BBC: Ben Bailey, 1281 shares on 20/02/03 at 178p (458p, £5,886.98)
CHU: Chaucer Holdings, 8092 shares on 06/10/03 at 42.88p (49p, £3965.08)
DNX: Dana Petroleum, 1551 shares on 20/11/03 at 223.75p (242p, £3753.42)
MBY: Mayborn Group, 1406 shares on 15/03/04 at 282p (275p, £3866.50)
Cash holdings: £2256.62
Since I've received dividends from Ben Bailey and Mayborn and bought more Chaucer shares:
BBC: Ben Bailey, 1281 shares on 20/02/03 at 178p (420p, £5,380.20)
CHU: Chaucer Holdings, 8092 shares on 06/10/03 at 42.88p (43p, £3479.56)
CHU: Chaucer Holdings, 4075 shares on 06/04/2004 at 54.75p (43p, £1752.25)
DNX: Dana Petroleum, 1551 shares on 20/11/03 at 223.75p (267p, £4141.17)
MBY: Mayborn Group, 1406 shares on 15/03/04 at 282p (255p, £3585.30)
Cash holdings: £158.97
A grand total of £18,497,45.
It's worth noting that two of my losing positions, more Chaucer at 54.75p and Mayborn at 282p both violated my 30% margin of safety rule at the time of purchase. Discipline is a very valuable virtue in an investor, if I had waited for my 30% criteria to be met I would still be at a loss on both of these purchases, but a good deal less so than currently.
The Artful Dodger
